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Abstract
We present an account of relevance in belief revision where,
intuitively, one wants to only consider the relevant part of an
agent’s epistemic state in a revision. We assume that rele-
vance is a domain-specific notion, and that (ir)relevance as-
sertions are given as part of the agent’s epistemic state. Such
assertions apply in a given context, and are of the form “in the
case that formula σ holds, the Y part of the agent’s epistemic
state is independent of the rest of the epistemic state”, where
Y is part of the signature of the language. Two approaches
are given, one in which (in semantic terms) conditions are
placed on a faithful ranking on possible worlds to enforce the
(ir)relevance assertions, and a second in which the possible
worlds characterising the agent’s beliefs may be modified in
a revision. These approaches are shown to yield the same
resulting belief set. Corresponding postulates and a represen-
tation result are given. The overall approach is compared to
that of Parikh’s for language splitting as well as with multi-
valued dependencies in relational databases.
1 Introduction
The area of belief revision addresses the problem in which
an agent is to incorporate a new belief into its belief cor-
pus. The dominant approach in belief revision, and in be-
lief change as a whole, is the AGM approach (Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985), named after its original
developers. A number of factors make revision a difficult
and subtle problem: Since it is desirable to maintain consis-
tency in a belief set if possible, and since a new belief may
conflict with the agent’s prior beliefs, some of these prior
beliefs may need to be removed before the new belief can
be consistently incorporated. The problem of which beliefs
to discard is not a purely logical problem, and there will be
domain constraints and epistemic factors to be taken into ac-
count in a practical revision system. To this end, a guiding
principle is that change should be minimal, in that as few
beliefs as possible are given up.
However, the notion of what constitutes minimal change
has proven to be a challenging problem; for example, see
(Rott 2000). In fact, not only should change be minimal, but
also in a revision one would want to deal with only that (min-
imal) part of the knowledge base that is relevant to the for-
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mula for revision. Indeed, as information repositories grow
progressively larger, it is crucial that a belief change be re-
stricted to a “local” portion of a knowledge base. Conse-
quently, an account of relevance in belief change is crucial,
both conceptually as well as computationally.
In this paper we present an account of relevance in belief
revision. We take relevance to be a domain dependent no-
tion, in which assertions of (ir)relevance are part of the back-
ground theory of a domain. For example, we may have the
assertion that, in the context of a party, whether Alice is there
is independent of whether Bob is there (because they don’t
know each other). Hence if we revise by the fact that Alice
was there, our beliefs about Bob’s presence should remain
unaffected. This is in contrast with most previous work on
relevance in belief change, which addresses the case where
an agent’s contingent beliefs can be split between two dis-
joint languages. Our goal here is, in revising a belief set
by a formula φ, to specify what part of the agent’s beliefs
are irrelevant with respect to φ; then these irrelevant beliefs
will be among the beliefs that an agent will retain follow-
ing revision. While our goals are foremost conceptual and
representational, such an approach would have the potential
for significant computational benefits in a practical system.
Informally, given that a task (like revision) in the worst case
grows exponentially more difficult with an increase in the
size of a language, then one might expect an exponential
improvement (in the best case) in restriciting revision to a
portion of the knowledge base.
The above example with Bob and Alice illustrates another
aspect of our approach, that assertions of relevance are gen-
erally not universal, but rather hold within a given context.
The concept of conditional independence from probability
theory provides a good analogy, given that independence as-
sumptions in probability theory are generally not uncondi-
tional, and they assert something about the overall structure
of a domain. However, as will become clear later, our ap-
proach does not really have much in common with (a qual-
itative counterpart to) probability theory, but rather will be
closer to notions of independence in databases, specifically
with multivalued dependencies.
In our approach, we begin with a standard AGM-style
framework, enhanced with a set of context-dependent ir-
relevance assertions forming part of the background the-
ory governing an agent’s epistemic state. On the postula-
tional side we give a postulate that states, for an assertion
of irrelevance, that the agent’s belief state following revi-
sion can be split into two parts, one reflecting those beliefs
that have changed, and the other part consisting of beliefs
unchanged from the initial belief set. We provide a seman-
tic constraint on faithful rankings that exactly captures this
postulate, and prove a representation result tying these two
notions together. In a secondary approach, the worlds char-
acterising the agent’s belief set are modified, with the “irrel-
evant” part of a world left unchanged. To our knowledge this
is the first time that revision has been based on the modifi-
cation of possible worlds. We show that the two approaches
coincide to the extent that in each case the agent’s belief set
is the same.
The next section collects notation used in the paper. This
is followed by a summary of background material, includ-
ing a brief introduction to belief revision and a survey of
previous work in the area. Section 4 discusses issues and in-
tuitions concerning relevance and our approach, while Sec-
tion 5 gives the formal details. Section 6 discusses relevant
related issues, after which there is a brief concluding section.
2 Notation
Define P = {A,B,C, . . . } to be a finite nonempty set of
propositional variables. In the approach, we need to dis-
tinguish the name of a propositional variable from its value
(or truth assignment) in a model. Upper case English letters
from the start of the alphabet are used for the former, and
lower case for the latter. For a propositional variable such as
A, one can think of a as A← true and ¬a as A← false.1
The symbol ⊥ is not included in P and is used to denote
contradiction; thus the truth value of⊥ is always set to false.
The propositional language built from P∪{⊥}with the stan-
dard Boolean connectives is denoted by L. For a subset Y of
P , we denote by LY the propositional language built from
Y ∪ {⊥} with the standard Boolean connectives. Observe
that even if Y = ∅, the sub-language LY is not empty since
it contains sentences like ⊥, ¬⊥, ⊥ ∨ ¬⊥, etc.
For any sentence φ ∈ L we denote by Pφ the smallest
subset of P with which we can write a sentence that is log-
ically equivalent to φ (this set is unique). For example, for
φ = a∧ (b∨¬b), Pφ = {A}. If φ is inconsistent or a tautol-
ogy we take Pφ to be the empty set. Lφ is the language built
from Pφ ∪ {⊥} with the standard Boolean connectives.2
The deductive closure of a set of formulas Γ is denoted
Cn(Γ). Sometimes, for a specific set of formulas we will
simply list the formulas, for example, writing Cn({φ, ψ})
as Cn(φ, ψ). An agent’s set of beliefs will be modelled by
a theory, also referred to as a belief set. Conventionally K
(K ′, etc.) is used to denote a belief set. Thus a belief set is a
set of formulas K such that K = Cn(K).
1This notation is borrowed from relational databases, where the
name of an attribute (such as Age) in a schema is distinguished
from its value (like 35) in a tuple in a relation instance.
2Much of the notation and terminology used in this article is
quite common in the belief revision literature. Part of our notation
and terminology related to sub-languages has been adopted from
(Parikh 1999) and/or (Peppas et al. 2015).
For a theory K of L, and a set Y ⊆ P , KY denotes the
restriction of K to LY ; i.e. KY = K ∩ LY . Clearly, since
K is a theory, KY is also a theory. Y is the complement of
Y with respect to P , that is, Y = P \Y . For any two sets of
atoms X,Y ⊆ P we will often use LXY as an abbreviation
of LX∪Y . Finally, for a sentence φ ∈ L, by Kφ we shall
denote the restriction of K to Lφ; i.e. Kφ = K ∩ Lφ.
M is the set of models, or possible worlds, over P . Indi-
vidual possible worlds are denoted by w, r, possibly super-
or subscripted. (Mnemonically, r is used to denote worlds
inconsistent with a belief setK whereasw is used for worlds
consistent with K; however w and r are simply possible
worlds.) For a formula (set of formulas) φ, [φ] is the set
of worlds at which φ is true. We will identify a model with
the set of literals satisfied at that model. Then, for possible
world w, we identify wX with the reduct3 of w with respect
to X ⊆ P , i.e. that part of w over X . For a set of possible
worlds W , we define WX = {wX | w ∈ M}. For a pos-
sible world w, we may refer to wX as the X part of w, and
similarly for belief sets, sets of worlds, etc.
3 Background
3.1 Belief Revision
In the AGM approach to belief change (Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985; Peppas 2008), an agent’s
beliefs are modelled by a belief set in which the underly-
ing logic is assumed to contain classical propositional logic.
This allows syntactic details, such as how a formula is ex-
pressed, to be ignored, and a focus placed on the logical
contents of an agent’s beliefs. In belief revision, a formula
φ is incorporated into a belief set K such that the result is
consistent (unless φ is itself inconsistent). Thus, if K ` ¬φ,
some formulas must be dropped from K before φ can be
consistently added. In developing an account of revision,
a simpler operator of expansion is first defined, where the
expansion of K by φ is given by:
K + φ
.
= Cn(K ∪ {φ}).
Formally, a revision operator ∗ maps a belief set K and for-
mula φ to a revised belief set K ∗ φ. The AGM postulates
for revision are as follows:
(K*1) K ∗ φ = Cn(K ∗ φ)
(K*2) φ ∈ K ∗ φ
(K*3) K ∗ φ ⊆ K + φ
(K*4) If ¬φ /∈ K then K + φ ⊆ K ∗ φ
(K*5) K ∗ φ is inconsistent only if φ is inconsistent
(K*6) If φ ≡ ψ then K ∗ φ = K ∗ ψ
(K*7) K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ K ∗ φ+ ψ
(K*8) If ¬ψ /∈ K ∗ φ then K ∗ φ+ ψ ⊆ K ∗ (φ ∧ ψ)
Motivation for these postulates can be found in (Gärdenfors
1988; Peppas 2008).
3The reduct is a standard notion from model theory (Hodges
1997; Chang and Keisler 2012), and should not be confused with
the notion of reduct in answer set programmming.
Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) have shown that a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for constructing an AGM revi-
sion operator is that there is a function that associates a total
preorder on the set of possible worlds with any belief set K,
as follows:4
Definition 1 A faithful assignment is a function that maps
each belief setK to a total preorderK onM such that for
any possible worlds w1, w2:
1. If w1 ∈ [K] then w1 K w2
2. If w1 ∈ [K] and w2 6∈ [K], then w1 ≺K w2.
This preorder is referred to as the faithful ranking associated
with K. Intuitively, w1 K w2 if w1 is at least as plausible
as w2. Katsuno and Mendelzon give a representation result,
where t(W ) is the set of formulas true in W :
Theorem 1 ((Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991)) A revision
operator * satisfies postulates (K*1)–(K*8) iff there exists
a faithful assignment that maps each belief set K to a total
preorder K such that
K ∗ φ = t(min([φ],K)).
Thus the revision ofK by φ is characterised by those models
of φ that are most plausible according to the agent.
Since we will deal with revision with respect to a single
belief set, for simplicity we drop the K subscript on a faith-
ful ranking, and just use .
3.2 Belief Change and Relevance
The problem of relevance is an important, if not crucial,
topic for many areas of AI; for example, a special issue of
the Artificial Intelligence Journal on the topic (Subramanian,
Greiner, and J. Pearl, editors 1997) contained papers dealing
with relevance in causality, conditional independence, and
inference, as would be expected, as well as in areas such as
machine learning, game playing, and computer vision. As
noted in the introduction, an account of relevance in belief
change is required not just as a component in a conceptual
framework, but is also essential for a general computational
account: In a large knowledge base, it is totally infeasible to
take the entirety of an agent’s beliefs into consideration and,
instead, belief change must be restricted to a local, relevant,
part of a knowledge base.
In belief revision, Gärdenfors (1990) was the first to con-
sider the problem of relevance; the key criterion he consid-
ered was the following:
If a belief state is revised by a sentence φ, then all sentences
in K that are independent of the validity of φ should be re-
tained in the revised state of belief.
Subsequently, Fariñas del Cerro and Herzig (1996) showed
how AGM contraction and a given dependence relation are
interdefinable, in much the same way as contraction and an
epistemic entrenchment relation are interdefinable; this di-
rection is further explored in (Oveisi et al. 2017).
4Katsuno and Mendelzon use formulas instead of belief sets.
Since we deal with finite languages, the difference is immaterial.
Parikh’s (1999) work on language splitting is perhaps the
best-known approach to incorporating relevance in belief re-
vision. Here, if a belief set K can be expressed in disjoint
languages L1 and L2, then for epistemic input φ ∈ L1, revi-
sion can be restricted to the L1 part of K. Parikh expresses
this in the following postulate:
(P) If K = Cn(χ, ψ) where χ, ψ are sentences of disjoint
sublanguages L1, L2 respectively, and φ ∈ L1, thenK ∗φ
= (CnL1(χ) ◦ φ) + ψ, where ◦ is a revision operator of
the sublanguage L1.
Parikh’s postulate encodes the intuition that an agent typ-
ically organises her beliefs into independent compartments
that refer to different subject areas; for example, beliefs
about life in Mars, would be held separately from beliefs
about one’s family history. Thus changes in one compart-
ment should not effect other compartments.
Parikh’s idea was extended in (Chopra and Parikh 2000)
to allow limited interaction between compartments. Given a
propositional language L, Chopra and Parikh define a be-
lief structure B on L to be a set of ordered pairs B =
{(L1, T1), . . . , (Ln, Tn)}, such that
⋃
Li = L and each
Ti is a consistent theory over the sublanguage Li. At first
glance a belief structure B looks equivalent to a belief set
K split into n ”local” compartments T1, . . . , Tn; i.e. K =
Cn(T1, . . . , Tn). There are however two crucial differences
between the two: (i) the sublanguages Li need not be dis-
joint, and (ii) even with mutually inconsistent local theories
Ti, the belief structure B does not necessarily collapse to
absurdity. This is accomplished with the use of four truth
values in evaluating the epistemic attitude of B towards a
sentence φ; see (Chopra and Parikh 2000) for details.
For the revision of the belief structure B =
{(L1, T1), . . . , (Ln, Tn)} by a sentence φ, Chopra and
Parikh offer two proposals, both of which are relevance-
sensitive. The first approach revises each local theory Ti
individually by the fraction of φ that can be expressed in
Li. More precisely, define the i-shadow of φ, denoted φi, to
be a sentence in Li such that Cn(φi) = Cn(φ) ∩ Li. Then
B ∗ φ is defined as {(L1, T1 ∗1 φ1), . . . , (Ln, Tn ∗n φn)},
where each ∗i is a local revision function defined over the
sublanguage Li. A weakness of this approach is that the
compartments never change; they remain fixed even in the
face of new information that makes connections between
two or more compartments. Moreover, breaking up the
new information φ into its shadows φ1, . . . , φn may lead
to information loss; i.e. φ1, . . . , φn is not always logically
equivalent to φ.
The second approach is more flexible with compartments
and does not suffer any information loss. Here, the revision
of B by φ is performed in three steps. Firstly, local theories
Ti that are relevant to φ are identified (i.e. all the Tis that
share at least one variable with the minimal language of φ).
Secondly, the relevant local theories are merged into a new
theoryH , and likewise their corresponding sublanguages Li
are merged in LH . Thirdly, (LH , H ∗φ) replaces all relevant
pairs (Li, Ti) in B, while the remaining elements of B are
left unchanged.
B-structures and their revision methods are important ex-
tensions of Parikh’s language splitting approach, but they lie
outside the AGM framework. Firstly, they are based on a
multivalued logic. Secondly, as noted in (Chopra and Parikh
2000), only the first six AGM postulates are taken into con-
sideration; the remaining two AGM postulates, known as the
supplementary postulates are omitted.
Extensions of Parikh’s approach within the AGM frame-
work have also been proposed. Kourousias and Makin-
son (2007) extend Parikh’s result to the infinite case.
Makinson (2009) shows that, while relevance is syntax-
independent, it is not language-independent; as well the cen-
tral definition is relaxed, allowing for extra-logical sources
of relevance. In another direction, Peppas, Fotinopoulos,
and Seremataki (2008) show that the Parikh postulate (P)
is in conflict with the Darwiche and Pearl postulates for iter-
ated belief revision. As well, (Peppas et al. 2015) provides
a representation theorem for axiom (P) in terms of new con-
straints on faithful rankings. Moreover they show that ax-
iom (P) is consistent with the full set of AGM postulates for
revision. (Aravanis, Peppas, and Williams 2017) provides
a characterisation of Parikh’s axiom (P) in terms of con-
straints on an epistemic entrenchment, while Kern-Isberner
and Brewka (2017) generalise the notion of syntax-spliting
to epistemic states; they also study ordinal conditional func-
tions (Spohn 1988) in this context.
3.3 Multivalued Dependencies
It proves to be the case that our approach is related to the no-
tion of multivalued dependencies in relational database the-
ory; see (Fagin 1977; Beeri, Fagin, and Howard 1977) for
the original papers, or (Abiteboul, Hull, and Vianu 1995) or
any of the many excellent texts on databases. In brief, a mul-
tivalued dependency is an assertion about a database relation
that says that if the values of a set of attributes (given by X
below) is fixed then the values of some attributes (Y below)
are independent of the other attributes. The definition of a
multivalued dependency is given as follows, expressed using
our notation:
Definition 2 ((Abiteboul, Hull, and Vianu 1995)) If P is
a set of attributes, then a multivalued dependency over P
is an expression of the form X → Y , where X,Y ⊆ P .
A relation W over P satisfies X → Y if W |= XY ./
X(P \ Y ), where ./ is the natural join operator.
The requirement W |= XY ./ X(P \ Y ) can be equiv-
alently expressed by stipulating that for any pair of tuples
that agree on theX values, say xy1z1 and xy2z2, if these tu-
ples are in a relation instance W , then xy1z2 is also a tuple
in W . Consequently, given a fixed value for X (viz. x), the
Y part of the relation is independent of the Z part.
In practice, if a multivalued dependency X → Y holds
over a relation R, this means that R can be split into two
relations R1 and R2 over XY and X(R \ Y ) respectively
such that no information is lost. As well, there is an axioma-
tisation of the class of multivalued dependencies.
4 The Approach: Intuitions
4.1 Relevance and Epistemic States
Parikh’s (1999) approach and subsequent work assumes that
(ir)relevance is a function of the agent’s contingent beliefs:
if it happens that the agent’s beliefs can be expressed in dis-
joint languages, then this may be exploited in a revision.
However, this criterion allows some instances where rele-
vance via language splitting should not be employed. Con-
sider the earlier example of a party for which the agent be-
lieves both Alice (a) and Bob (b) were there; thus K =
Cn(a, b). Now consider the following two cases:
1. Alice and Bob are a couple; they are always together. So
the KB should reflect this, naively K ′ = K + (a ≡ b).
2. Alice and Bob are total strangers; they have never met.
In the first case, a and b are clearly dependent, whereas in the
second they are independent. However, obviously K = K ′
in the first case, because we’re dealing with belief sets. Thus,
by Parikh’s criterion, in both cases a and b are independent,
and so if we learn that Alice was not there we would still
conclude that Bob was present. In the first case this is clearly
counterintuitive.
As well, there are cases where the agent’s beliefs cannot
be expressed in disjoint sublanguages and yet employing rel-
evance in revision is justifiable. Consider the following ex-
ample, where we assume that beliefs concerning a person’s
car are independent of beliefs regarding their phone. We be-
lieve that Daphne has a Honda or an iPhone; hence there is
no splitting based on these contingent beliefs. If we later
learn that Daphne has a different car, our beliefs concerning
her phone(s) would presumably remain unchanged. Thus,
Postulate (P) is of no help in dealing with relevance in this
case. From these examples, we see that information in an
agent’s belief set is insufficient to determine relevance. We
go beyond this and take relevance as a feature not of a (con-
tingent) belief set, but as a feature of the agent’s underlying
belief state or epistemic state. Hence, relevance influences
an agent’s revision policy.
Last, it can be argued that for a sufficiently general lan-
guage, there may be no instances in which (P) can be ap-
plied. To see this, consider a first-order setting and con-
sider any two objects that appear to be unrelated, for ex-
ample a bird somewhere in Canada, denoted bird132, and
the Greek philosopher Plato, denoted by the constant plato.
These two individuals would seem to have nothing to do
with each other, and so learning something about one should
have nothing to do with the other. However, any theory with
bird132 and plato will presumably have atomic formulas
like Bird(bird132) and Human(plato). It would seem that
these two facts should be independent with respect to any
revision involving either. Yet, no language splitting into L1
and L2 with Bird(bird132) ∈ L1, Human(plato) 6∈ L1
and with Bird(bird132) 6∈ L2, Human(plato) ∈ L2 will
allow the derivation ¬Bird(plato). Consequently, language
splitting appears to be too weak in this case to handle such
presumably-unrelated assertions. That is, in reasoning that
a bird and a historical individual belong to different cate-
gories, there must be language elements that allow one to
reason from one notion to the other, and thus a chain of lan-
guage elements relating the two notions. However, any such
chain of course defeats any language splitting.
4.2 Independence Assertions
An independence assertion5 or irrelevance assertion is an
ordered pair (σ, Y ) such that Y is a set of propositional vari-
ables (Y ⊆ P ), and σ ∈ L is a consistent sentence. We shall
often denote the independence assertion (σ, Y ) as σ → Y .
If σ = > we shall call σ → Y an unconditional indepen-
dence assertion.
Intuitively, for the independence assertion σ → Y , the
formula σ specifies some precondition or context, and Y ,
being part of the signature, specifies some “subject matter”.
Then, the assertion σ → Y states that if σ ∈ K, then revi-
sion by any proposition φ ∈ LY , where ¬φ ∈ K, is inde-
pendent of LY . So this is more general than multivalued de-
pendencies in databases (from where we have borrowed the
notation) in which an assertion would be given as X → Y ;
i.e. for any complete, consistent set of literals from X , Y
is independent of P \ Y . It is similarly more general than
Pearl’s (1988) approach to independence.
Here is an example, adapted from (Pearl 1988). Let P =
{A, J,M}. If there is a fire alarm (A), then Mary and John
(who live within earshot) are expected to phone (M and J
respectively). If there is no alarm then John or Mary calling
are independent (since they don’t know each other). Thus:
¬a → J (or equivalently ¬a → M – the two assertions
have the same effect).
An important assumption in our approach is that rele-
vance assertions are employed only when the formula for
revision conflicts with the agent’s belief set. This assump-
tion is not required by the formalism, but rather is arguably
more desirable. Consider the earlier example where if there
is no alarm then John phoning is independent of Mary phon-
ing, and where K = Cn(¬a,¬j ∨ ¬m). Assume that we
learn that John called. There are two possibilities: First, the
fact that John called is consistent with the agent’s knowl-
edge; and in this case the AGM approach stipulates that
revision is the same as expansion. We would have that
K ∗ j = Cn(¬a, j,¬m). Second, if we decide that the
M part of the belief set is independent of the J part then,
via our notion of irrelevance, we would have that K ∗ j =
(KA,J ∗ j) + KA,M = Cn(¬a, j). The first alternative is
preferable for several reasons: the result is more intuitive; it
complies with the AGM approach; and it entails that rel-
evance assertions are used only to guide a change in the
agent’s beliefs, and not an expansion of the beliefs.
Consider then where we have an assertion σ → Y . The
general idea is that in revising by φ ∈ LY where K ` σ ∧
¬φ, the Y part of the agent’s belief set remains unchanged
while revision only affects the Y part of the agent’s beliefs.
In fact, there are two ways in which this can be expressed
semantically via a faithful ranking.
First, in a faithful ranking the Y part of the K worlds can
be “duplicated” at the minimum φ worlds. This in turn will
5The focus on independence, rather than dependence, assertions
is discussed in Section 6.
require that σ → Y have the properties of a multivalued
dependency at this set of worlds (hence our adoption of this
notation). This requires a constraint that can be seen as ex-
tending the conditions of a faithful ranking to the set of Y
“subworlds”. A representation result shows that the class of
functions captured by the AGM postulates along with our
relevance postulate is exactly that given by faithful rankings
with the additional constraints.
The second alternative is simple but intuitive: In a revi-
sion, the Y part of a belief set is modified, and so the pos-
sible worlds characterising K are modified so that φ is be-
lieved. (This to our knowledge is the first time in which
belief revision is carried out by “editing” possible worlds,
rather than modifying a faithful ranking.) We show that the
agent’s resulting belief set is the same as that obtained via
the first approach.
5 The Approach
We shall say that a revision function ∗ complies with the
independence assertion σ → Y at a theory K, iff either
σ 6∈ K or for every consistent sentence φ, the following
condition holds:
(R) If φ ∈ LY and ¬φ ∈ K, thenK∗φ = (K∗φ)Y +KY .
Thus for an independence assertion σ → Y , if K contains
σ and entails ¬φ where φ ∈ LY , then the revision of K by
φ is made up of K ∗ φ restricted to LY , together with that
part of K over the non-Y part of the language, that is, over
LY . For a set Θ of independence assertions we say that a
revision function ∗ complies with Θ at a theoryK iff ∗ com-
plies with each one of the independence assertions in Θ at
K. If ∗ complies with Θ at all theories of L, we shall simply
say that ∗ complies with Θ. In Section 5.3 we show that the
effects of axiom (P) can be captured with appropriately de-
fined independence assertions; hence our work generalises
Parikh’s relevance-sensitive revision.
We say that a set of independence assertions Θ is consis-
tent with the AGM postulates iff there is at least one AGM
revision function that complies with it. In what follows we
provide representation results for (R), and we study neces-
sary and sufficient conditions under which a set of indepen-
dence assertions Θ is consistent with the AGM postulates.
5.1 Characterisation via Faithful Preorders
Condition (R) can be characterised semantically in terms of
the following constraints over faithful rankings. Let σ → Y
be an independence assertion and assume thatK contains σ;
then we have:
(S1) If rY = r′Y , ¬rY ∈ K, and ¬r 6∈ KY , then r  r′.
(S2) If rY = r′Y , ¬rY ∈ K, ¬r 6∈ KY , and ¬r′ ∈ KY ,
then r ≺ r′.
Conditions (S1) - (S2) essentially say the following. If two
worlds r, r′ agree over the variables in Y and with none of
the K-worlds, then their comparative plausibility depends
on their agreement with the K-world over the remaining
variables. In particular, (S1) says, if there exists a K-world
that agrees with r over all Y variables (which follows from
¬r 6∈ KY ), then r is at least as plausible as r′. If in addition,
(S2) says, there is no K-world that agrees with r′ over the
Y variables (which follows from ¬r′ ∈ KY ), then r is in
fact strictly more plausible than r′. Another way to think of
conditions (S1) - (S2) is the following. Suppose that we par-
tition the set of possible worlds into classes based on their
values over Y ; i.e. two worlds r, r′ belong to the same class
iff they agree over the variables in Y . Then (S1) and (S2)
tell us that the minimal (or most plausible) worlds in each
class are the ones that agree with some K-world over the
remaining variables.
These conditions can be regarded as generalising those
of a faithful ranking. In (S1) and (S2), if one takes Y =
∅ and assumes that ¬r∅ ∈ K holds vacuously, then these
conditions reduce to the two conditions in Definition 1.
The next result shows that AGM revision functions aug-
mented with Postulate (R) are captured exactly by faithful
rankings that conform to (S1) and (S2).
Theorem 2 Let σ → Y be an independence assertion, K
a theory that contains σ,  a preorder faithful to K, and ∗
the revision function induced from  at K. Then ∗ satisfies
(R) iff  satisfies (S1)-(S2).
Proof
(⇒ )
Assume that ∗ satisfies (R). For (S1) let r, r′ be any two
worlds such that rY = r′Y , ¬rY ∈ K and ¬r 6∈ KY (or
equivalently r ∈ [KY ]). From (R) we derive that [K ∗rY ] =
[(K ∗ rY )Y ] ∩ [KY ]. Clearly, [(K ∗ rY )Y ] = [rY ] and
therefore [K ∗ rY ] = [rY ] ∩ [KY ]. Hence from r ∈ [KY ]
we derive that r ∈ [K ∗ rY ]. This again entails that r ∈
min([rY ],). Moreover from rY = r′Y it follows that r′ ∈
[rY ]. Hence from r ∈ min([rY ],) we derive that r  r′
as desired.
The proof of (S2) is almost identical to that for (S1). In
particular, consider any two worlds r, r′ such that rY = r′Y ,
¬rY ∈ K, ¬r 6∈ KY (or equivalently r ∈ [KY ]), and
¬r′ ∈ KY (or equivalently r′ 6∈ [KY ]). Following ex-
actly the same line of argument as before we conclude
that r ∈ min([rY ],). Moreover, by (R), [K ∗ rY ] =
[(K ∗ rY )Y ] ∩ [KY ]. Then from r′ 6∈ [KY ] we derive that
r′ 6∈ min([rY ],). Given that r′ ∈ [rY ] (since rY = r′Y )
we then conclude that r ≺ r′ as desired.
(⇐ )
Assume that  satisfies (S1) - (S2). Consider any sen-
tence φ ∈ L. If φ is inconsistent, then (R) is trivially
true. Assume therefore that φ 6|= ⊥, and moreover that
φ ∈ LY , and K |= ¬φ. We show that min([φ],) =
[
∨
min([φ],)Y ] ∩ [KY ].
First we show that LHS ⊆ RHS. Consider any world
r ∈ min([φ],). Clearly r ∈ [
∨
min([φ],)Y ]. Hence
what’s left to show is that r ∈ [KY ]. Assume on the contrary
that r 6∈ [KY ]. Letw be any world in [K]. Define r′ to be the
world that agrees with r over Y and with w over Y . From
φ ∈ LY and r ∈ [φ] we derive that rY |= φ. Since rY = r′Y
we then derive that r′Y |= φ, or equivalently, that ¬φ |=
¬r′Y . Consequently, from ¬φ ∈ K, we derive that ¬r′Y ∈
K. Then, from (S2) we get that r′ ≺ r, which however
contradicts r ∈ min([φ],). This shows that min([φ],
) ⊆ [
∨
min([φ],)Y ] ∩ [KY ].
For the converse, let r be any world in [
∨
min([φ],
)Y ] ∩ [KY ]. Since r ∈ [
∨
min([φ],)Y ], there exists a
world r′ ∈ min([φ],) such that r′Y = rY . Moreover,
since φ ∈ LY and r′ ∈ [φ], we derive that r′Y |= φ, or
equivalently, that ¬φ |= ¬r′Y . Hence from r′Y = rY it fol-
lows that ¬φ |= ¬rY . Then from ¬φ ∈ K we get ¬rY ∈ K.
Hence from (S1) it follows that r  r′. This again entails
that r ∈ min([φ],) as desired. 
5.2 Characterisation via Local Revisions
We next consider a second way in which independence as-
sertions may be used in a revision function. Informally, for
a formula φ ∈ LY satisfying certain properties, the idea is
that the Y part (i.e. over the subsignature Y ⊆ P ) of the
possible worlds in K are modified, while the Y part is left
unchanged, with the result that φ is believed in the set of
modified possible worlds.
Let Q ⊆ P be a nonempty set of propositional variables
and LQ the sublanguage of L built over the variables in Q.
We shall call any AGM revision function ◦ over LQ a local
revision function. Moreover, as a contrast to local revisions,
we shall often call AGM revision functions defined over the
entire language L, global revision functions.
Relevance and local revision are tightly connected. In par-
ticular, let σ → Y be an independence assertion and K a
consistent theory satisfying σ. Moreover let ◦ be a local re-
vision function defined over LY . Using ◦ we can (partially)
construct a global revision function as follows:
(LR) If φ ∈ LY and ¬φ ∈ K, then K ∗ φ = (KY ◦ φ) +
KY .
The above definition has a very intuitive appeal. It says
that to revise K by φ one simply modifies the relevant part
ofK to accommodate φ, and then adds the non-relevant part
of K. Viewed semantically, (LR) essentially says that the
revision of K by φ is performed by taking each K-world
w and modifying only its Y -part (to bring about φ), while
leaving the rest of w unchanged.
Clearly (LR) and (R) look very similar. There is however
a feature of relevance-sensitive revision that goes unnoticed
with (R) and is made explicit with (LR): the local modifica-
tions to K (or to its worlds) to bring about φ, are performed
in accordance to the same principles that govern global revi-
sion:
Theorem 3 Let σ → Y be an independence assertion, ∗
a global revision function, and K a theory that contains σ.
Then ∗ satisfies (R) at K iff there is a local revision function




Assume that ∗ satisfies (R) at K. Define the function ◦
over the language LY as follows: KY ◦ φ = (K ∗ φ)Y ,
for all φ ∈ LY . Clearly (LR) follows immediately for all
consistent φ ∈ LY . Hence to complete this part of the proof
we need to show that ◦ satisfies the AGM postulates. We
do so by constructing a faithful preorder Y to KY over the
worlds inMY , such that [KY ◦ φ]Y = min([φ]Y ,Y ).6
Since ∗ is an AGM revision function, there exists a pre-
order overM that is faithful to K and such that [K ∗ φ] =
min([φ],) for all φ ∈ L. Based on  we construct Y as
follows: for any r, r′ ∈ MY , r Y r′, iff there is a z ∈ [r]
such that z  z′, for all z′ ∈ [r′].
It suffices to show that Y is a total preorder, it is faith-
ful to KY , and moreover, for all φ ∈ LY , [KY ◦ φ]Y =
min([φ]Y ,Y ).
Clearly Y is reflexive. For transitivity, let r, r′, r′′ be
any three worlds in MY such that r Y r′ Y r′′. Let
z, z′, z′′ be -minimal worlds in [r], [r′], [r′′] respectively.
Then, by the construction of Y we have that z  z′  z′′;
hence z  z′′. Since z′′ is -minimal in [r′′], it follows that
r Y r′′ as desired.
For totality, let r, r′ be any two worlds inMY such that
r′ 6Y r. Then for every z′ ∈ [r′] there is a z ∈ [r] such
that z′ 6 z, or equivalently, z ≺ z′. Let u be a -minimal
element in [r]. We then derive that u ≺ z′ for all z′ ∈ [r′].
Hence r Y r′ as desired.
For faithfulness, if KY is inconsistent then faithfulness
trivially holds. Assume therefore that KY is consistent.
Then so is K (by the definition of KY ). Consider now any
world r ∈ [KY ]Y , and let r′ be any world inMY . It is not
hard to verify that there exists a world z ∈ [K] such that
z ∈ [r]. Since z ∈ [K], and given that  is faithful to K,
it follows that z  z′ for all z′ ∈ [r′]. Hence r Y r′.
Consider next a r′′ ∈ MY such that r′′ 6∈ [KY ]. Then for
all z′′ ∈ [r′′], z′′ 6∈ [K]. Hence, since  is faithful to K, it
follows that z ≺ z′′ for all z′′ ∈ [r′′]. This again entails that
r ≺Y r′′. Thus Y is faithful to KY as desired.
Finally we prove that [KY ◦ φ]Y = min([φ]Y ,Y ), or
equivalently that [(K ∗ φ) ∩ LY ]Y = min([φ]Y ,Y ). It
is not hard to verify that [(K ∗ φ) ∩ LY ]Y = {z ∩ LY :
z ∈ [K∗φ]}. Hence, since [K∗φ] = min([φ],), it suffices
to show that {z∩LY : z ∈ min([φ],)} =min([φ]Y ,Y ).
Assume that r ∈ {z∩LY : z ∈ min([φ],)}; i.e., there is
a z ∈ min([φ],) such that r = z ∩LY . Clearly, r ∈MY .
Moreover, since φ ∈ LY and z |= φ, it follows that r ∈
[φ]Y . Consider now any r′ ∈ [φ]Y and let z′ be any world
in [r′]. Since r′ |= φ it follows that z′ |= φ. Hence since z
is -minimal in [φ] we derive that z  z′. Hence r Y r′,
and therefore, since r′ was chosen as an arbitrary member
of [φ]Y , it follows that r ∈ min([φ]Y ,Y ). Thus we have
shown that {z ∩LY : z ∈ min([φ],)} ⊆ min([φ]Y ,Y ).
For the converse, let r be any element of min([φ]Y ,Y ).
Let u be a -minimal element of [r]. Clearly, since r |= φ,
so does u; i.e. u ∈ [φ]. Moreover by construction r =
u∩LY . Hence to show that r ∈ {z∩LY : z ∈ min([φ],)}
it suffices to show that u is -minimal in [φ]. Let u′ be an
arbitrary world in [φ]. Define r′ = u′ ∩ LY . Since u′ |= φ
and φ ∈ LY , it follows that r′ ∈ [φ]Y . Hence r Y r′.
6Recall thatM denotes the set of possible worlds over the lan-
guage L, while MY denotes the set of possible worlds over the
language LY . Likewise, for a set of possible worlds U , by UY we
denote the restriction (or: reduct) of the U -worlds to the sublan-
guage LY .
This again entails that u  u′. Since u′ was chosen as an
arbitrary φ-world, it follows that u is -minimal in [φ] as
desired.
(⇐ )
Assume that there is a local revision function ◦ over the
language LY such that (LR) is satisfied at K. To prove that
(R) holds at K it suffices to show that for all φ ∈ LY , (K ∗
φ)Y = KY ◦ φ.7 To this aim, observe that for any A ⊆ LY ,
any B ⊆ LY , and any sentence ψ ∈ LY , if ψ 6∈ Cn(A),
then ψ 6∈ A+B.
Now, for (K ∗ φ)Y ⊆ KY ◦ φ, let ψ be any sentence in
(K ∗ φ)Y . Then clearly, ψ ∈ LY and ψ ∈ K ∗ φ. Therefore
by (LR), ψ ∈ (KY ◦ φ) + KY . Since ψ ∈ LY , by the
observation above, we derive that ψ ∈ KY ◦ φ. Hence we
have shown that (K ∗ φ)Y ⊆ KY ◦ φ.
For the converse, let ψ be any sentence inKY ◦φ. Clearly
ψ ∈ LY . Moreover from (LR), it follows that ψ ∈ K ∗ φ.
Therefore, since ψ ∈ LY , it follows immediately that ψ ∈
(K ∗ φ)Y as desired. 
5.3 Relationship with Parikh’s Postulate
In this section we examine the relationship between in-
dependence assertions and Parikh’s approach to relevance-
sensitive revision. We recall that there are two different
readings to the axiom proposed by Parikh (see (Peppas et
al. 2015)). Herein we shall focus on the weaker version of
Parikh’s axiom, which is more general and less controver-
sial:8
(wP) If K = Cn(χ, ψ), Lχ ∩ Lψ = ∅, and φ ∈ Lχ, then
(K ∗ φ) ∩ Lψ = K ∩ Lψ .
To relate (wP) to our condition (R), we need to borrow
some more definitions from (Parikh 1999): For a theory K,
we say that a partition S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of P is a K-
splitting iff there exist sentences α1, . . . , αn, such that αi ∈
LSi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and moreover K = Cn(α1, . . . , αn).
We call S the finest K-splitting iff S is a K-splitting and
it refines every other K-splitting.9 Parikh, (Parikh 1999),
has shown that for every theory K there is only one finest
K-splitting.
To every partition S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of P we shall assign
the following set γ(S) of independence assertions:
γ(S) = {> → Y : for some Q ⊆ S, Y = ∪Q}.
In other words, γ(S) consists of all independence assertions
> → Y such that Y is the union of some elements of S.
Theorem 4 Let K be a theory, S = {S1, . . . , Sn} the finest
K-splitting, and ∗ an AGM revision function. Then ∗ satis-
fies (wP) at K iff ∗ complies with γ(S) at K.
Proof.
(⇒ )
Assume that ∗ satisfies (wP) at K, and let > → Y be
any independence assertion in γ(S). By construction, there
7Recall that by definition, KY ◦ φ is a theory of LY ; hence
KY ◦ φ = (KY ◦ φ)Y .
8In (Peppas et al. 2015), axiom (wP) is called (R1).
9A partition S refines another partition S′, iff for every Si ∈ S,
there is S′j ∈ S′, such that Si ⊆ S′j (see (Peppas et al. 2015)).
is a Q ⊆ S such that Y = ∪Q. Since S is a K-splitting,
it follows that there exist sentence χ, ψ such that χ ∈ LY ,
ψ ∈ LY , and K = Cn(χ, ψ). Consider now any sentence
φ ∈ LY such that ¬φ ∈ K. From (wP) it follows that
(K ∗φ)Y = KY . Moreover, (wP) entails that {Y, Y } is also
a K ∗φ-splitting,10 and therefore, K ∗φ = (K ∗φ)Y + (K ∗
φ)Y . Consequently we derive that K ∗ φ = (K ∗ φ)Y +KY
as desired.
(⇐ )
Assume that ∗ complies with γ(S) at K. We show that ∗
satisfies (wP) at K. Let χ, ψ be any two sentences such that
K = Cn(χ, ψ) and Lχ ∩ Lψ = ∅. Then clearly {Pχ, Pχ}
is a K-splitting and consequently there is a subset Q of the
finest K-splitting S, such that Pχ = ∪Q. Define Y = Pχ.
Clearly then the independence assertion > → Y belongs to
γ(S), and therefore ∗ complies with > →→ Y at K. Con-
sider now any sentence φ ∈ Lχ. To prove (wP) we need to
show that (K ∗ φ)Y = KY .
If ¬φ 6∈ K thenK∗φ = K+φ, and consequentlyK∗φ =
Cn(χ∧φ, ψ). Since χ∧φ ∈ Y , we derive immediately that
(K ∗ φ)Y = Cn(ψ)Y = KY as desired. Assume therefore
that ¬φ ∈ K. Then since ∗ complies with > → Y at K,
we derive that K ∗φ = (K ∗φ)Y +KY . Hence, once again,
(K ∗ φ)Y = KY as desired. 
5.4 Relationship with (Database) Multivalued
Dependencies
It is not too surprising that there are connections between
our approach and that of multivalued dependencies in rela-
tional databases. Specifically, a faithful ranking corresponds
to a total preorder over the set of possible worldsM, where
the worlds in each set are equally plausible. Each such set of
worlds can be thought of as an instance of a database rela-
tion. the relation’s set of attributes is given by the (names
of the) propositional variables in P , and each world can
be thought of as a relation tuple. Then it proves to be the
case that each such set of worlds, with the exception of [K],
which was excluded by fiat, conforms to each of the inde-
pendence assertions, viewed as multivalued dependencies.
This is expressed in the following result:
Theorem 5 Let K be a theory that contains σ, and ∗ a
revision function that complies with σ → Y . Let X be
the minimal set of atoms required to express σ, and let
x ∈ [σ]X . Then for any φ ∈ LY where ¬φ ∈ K we have
that xy1z1, xy2z2 ∈ [K ∗ φ] implies that xy1z2 ∈ [K ∗ φ].
Proof
Let K be a theory that contains σ, ∗ a revision function
that complies with σ → Y , and ¬φ ∈ K where φ ∈ LY .
Let x ∈ [σ]X where X is the minimal set of atoms required
to express σ. Assume that xy1z1, xy2z2 ∈ [K ∗ φ].
We have from (R) that K ∗ φ = (K ∗ φ)Y +KY , and so
[K ∗ φ] = [(K ∗ φ)Y +KY ], or
[K ∗ φ] = [(K ∗ φ)Y ] ∩ [KY ]. (1)
10This follows immediately from the results reported in (Peppas
et al. 2015)
Since xy1z1 ∈ [K ∗φ] we obtain that xy1z1 ∈ [(K ∗φ)Y ],
and so y1 ∈ [(K ∗ φ)Y ]Y .11 However, y1 ∈ [(K ∗ φ)Y ]Y
implies that xy1z2 ∈ [(K ∗ φ)Y ].
Similarly xy2z2 ∈ [K ∗ φ] implies via (1) that xy2z2 ∈
[KY ]. Consequently xz2 ∈ [KY ]Y , which in turn implies
that xy1z2 ∈ [KY ].
We thus have that xy1z2 ∈ [(K ∗φ)Y ] and xy1z2 ∈ [KY ],
which via (1) implies that xy1z2 ∈ [K ∗φ], which was to be
shown. 
Our notion of independence assertions is more general
than that of database multivalued dependencies, since for
σ → Y , σ may be an arbitrary formula. However, the above
result indicates that in the case where, for every indepen-
dence assertion σ → Y , σ is equivalent to a conjunction of
literals, we inherit the formal results concerning multivalued
dependencies. (How these results may extend to an arbitrary
formula σ is a topic for future research.) In particular, there
is an axiomatisation of such dependencies, and so one can
talk about a dependency being derived from others. More-
over, for a set of dependencies Θ, and set of atomsX , the set
dep(X) = {Y ⊆ P | Θ ` X → Y } is a Boolean algebra
of sets for P . Hence for each such X , one just needs to keep
track of the⊆-minimal elements of dep(X). For details, see
any of the references of Section 3.3.
6 Discussion
In this section we consider two pragmatic issues having to
do with the approach. First we discuss the emphasis on en-
coding irrelevance, as opposed to relevance assertions. Sec-
ond, since irrelevance assertions must be specified as part of
a background theory, the question arises as to where such
assertions may come from.
Why irrelevance (and not relevance) assertions? There
are two broad ways in which (ir)relevance properties can be
specified: one can state what is relevant, and then every-
thing not mentioned is irrelevant; or one can specify what is
irrelevant, and then everything else is potentially relevant.
An example of the first category is Bayesian nets, where
the structure of a network determines what is relevant to
what (i.e. conditionally dependent), and then from this (via
the Bayesian network independence assumption or using the
Markov blanket, e.g. (Russell and Norvig 2010)), one can
determine certain conditional independence relations. An
example of the second category is multivalued dependencies
in database systems.
Our approach is in the second category. The main rea-
son for this is that it is more conservative. The AGM ap-
proach is intended to be as general as possible with respect
to belief change, and our approach is in keeping with this
stance. That is, our approach allows one to incorporate
further domain-specific information via independence asser-
tions, to further constrain the class of rational revision func-
tions. However, if, in encoding a domain, an assertion of ir-
relevance is missed then one simply has less domain-specific
11Recall for a set of possible worlds W that WY is the set of
worlds over subsignature Y .
information to work with. This is in contrast with a Bayesian
network, for example, where if a causal relation is missed,
then the set of inferable conditional independence relations
will increase.
Where do assertions of (ir)relevance come from? No-
tions of independence and (ir)relevance are an important as-
pect of information regarding a domain. Hence in our view,
in constructing a rational, knowledge-based agent that can
change its beliefs, specifying such assertions will be an im-
portant part of the axiomatisation of the underlying domain.
An important question then is, where do these assertions
come from and how may they be determined? Fortunately,
there is no lack of possibilities:
1. As a base case, independence assertions may be specified
directly, based on knowledge of the domain, as is done in
relational databases – for example, that information about
a person’s phone is independent of their cars.
2. Independence assertions may be determined from a given
physical or causal theory. For example, Amir and McIl-
raith (2005) give an account of an espresso maker, where
variables water and steam in their theory allow a theory
to be partitioned; for our approach, fixed values of these
variables will in turn yield independence assertions.
3. Such assertions can be extracted from a structure that
contains implicit independence information, for example,
from Bayesian or Markov networks. Thus, in a Bayesian
net, independence is given via the Bayes net indepen-
dence assumption and the Markov blanket, notions that
can readily be translated into independence assertions.
Similarly, in a belief base, which need not be deductively
closed, the way in which information is represented may
indicate what items are related to what. For example, the
belief bases {a, b} and {a ∧ b} express the same infor-
mation, but the first may provide evidence that a and b are
unrelated, whereas in the second a∧b constitutes a single,
perhaps indivisible, item of information.
4. Much more speculatively, it may be that in a nonclassi-
cal logic or fragment of a classical logic, independence
may be assumed (perhaps by default) in the structure of a
knowledge base.
Specifically, in a description logic, independence may be
implicit in some fashion with respect to the subsumption
hierarchy or role structure. Consider for example a struc-
ture such as
(∃R1.C1) u (∃R2.C2)
which expresses the concept that is R1 related to concept
C1, and similarly forR2, C2. It may be that one can assert
or assume that a change to the first term is independent of
the second.
These considerations give rise to a related issue, that of
determining the scope of an independence assertion; i.e. the
set of atoms that ought to appear in its right hand side. Con-
sider the example above, where we take information about
a person’s phone to be independent of that about their cars.
The notion of “information about a person’s phone” includes
items such as the phone’s colour, make, and battery level.
Hence a correct encoding of the independence of a person’s
phone from his/her car, would require an independence as-
sertion whose right hand side includes all of these items.
Specifying such domain-specific related information may be
nontrivial, but in principle it can be specified, as indeed is
done in the admittedly-simpler context of relational database
systems.
Moreover, here again it may be possible to automate the
extraction of such related information. Thus, in Item 2
above, fixing the values of water and steam results in a
partitioned theory in which the propositional atoms in a par-
tition would make up a suitable “subject” for the right-hand
side of an independence assertion, yielding an assertion, for
example, of the form steam → 〈set of atoms〉. Similarly,
in Item 3 above, the Bayesian network independence as-
sumption — that for a variable X , given values for its par-
ents, that variable is independent of its nondescendants —
would seem to lead to independence assertions of the form
parents(X)→ descendants(X).
So to conclude, What we have done in this paper is to ar-
gue that independence assertions are necessary in a general
account of belief revision, and to show how a set of indepen-
dence assertions may be incorporated in the AGM approach.
However, a full account of relevance in AI and in reasoning
in general remains the subject of ongoing research.
7 Conclusion
In belief change, as in many areas of AI, relevance or in-
dependence is an important notion, both conceptually and
computationally. For belief revision, we take relevance to
be a guiding principle when a formula for revision is incon-
sistent with an agent’s beliefs. (If a formula is consistent
with an agent’s beliefs, then the success postulate seems to
say all that needs to be said.)
We have argued that relevance is a domain-specific no-
tion, and that (ir)relevance assertions are given as part of
the agent’s epistemic state, expressing knowledge regarding
the structure of the domain. Such assertions need not hold
universally, but rather apply in a given context, specifying
for σ → Y that “in the case where σ holds, the Y part
of the agent’s epistemic state is independent of the rest of
the epistemic state”. In the main approach, conditions were
placed on a faithful ranking on possible worlds to enforce
the (ir)relevance assertions. As well, corresponding postu-
lates and a representation result were given. In a second
approach, the possible worlds characterising the agent’s be-
liefs are modified to effect revision. Interestingly, these ap-
proaches, based on somewhat differing intuitions, nonethe-
less yield the same belief set following revision.
The approach to relevance can also be seen as contributing
to the desiderata of minimal change underlying the AGM
approach. That is, the AGM approach provides constraints
on how a rational agent may revise its beliefs; independence
assertions give a means for specifying additional domain-
specific constraints on a revision function. Hence the AGM
approach is augmented and, by allowing the specification of
additional domain-specific information, the approach may
provide a step toward the development of specific, practical
revision systems.
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